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Threats of Chinese ports located in the European space
China has financial influence over more than 100 major ports
in 50 countries of the world, controls all major maritime / container routes,
including the Suez Canal, owns up to 20 major ports in Europe, has the most
powerful maritime merchant fleet consisting of 1300 ships. In this sense, China
is a maritime superpower.
Container cargo turnover is unevenly distributed between
Europe and Asia. According to the figures for 2023, container cargo turnover
from Asia to Europe amounted to 16.5 million TEU units, of which 76% or 12.5
million TEU units are of Chinese origin.
Container cargo turnover from Europe to Asia amounted to 6.5
million TEU, 49% or 3.2 million TEU - to China.
The imbalance between container flows from Asia to Europe
and Europe to Asia is 2.5. To put it simply, 2.5 times more loaded containers
are transported by sea routes from Asia to Europe than from Europe to Asia.
In the conditions of increased container cargo flow, China
is increasingly actively trying to master the port infrastructure in Europe.
In the northern part of Europe, China owns the ports of
Hamburg, Marseille, Antwerp, Rotterdam with varying shareholdings.
In the southern part - the ports of Genoa, Bilbao, Valencia,
Piraeus, and Comporta, located near Istanbul.
China has selected ports in the north and south of Europe in
such a way that they practically completely cover the European part.
It is also worth noting that after China acquired ports in
the European space, it gradually began to purchase shares in railway operators
technologically connected to these ports. This allowed it to spread the
container flow from its ports to the entire perimeter of Europe via land
arteries. In practice, China, along with the port infrastructure, has acquired
rail land transportation.
With the acquisition of railway operators by China, the
security of transportation was threatened, which was manifested in the fact
that it became difficult for the European Union to manage rail transportation
under one umbrella.
In parallel with China's acquisition of maritime
infrastructure in Europe, the military component has also come to the fore,
which has created additional tension. In particular, China is building any
container ship with such technology that in a war situation it is possible to
convert it into a military ship in a short time and use it in military
operations.
It is worth considering the fact that today China holds 65%
of shipbuilding contracts.
All new container ships of the Chinese company COSCO can be converted
into military ships in a short time and used in military operations.
In such conditions, ports do not need to be converted into
military facilities, but there is a danger that China will be able to
potentially illegally import military cargo into the territory of the European
Union and NATO.
If we look at the schematic map presented in the chapter of
our analysis, we will clearly see that for some reason China does not own a
single port in Russia, which naturally has its own reasons.
China mainly acquired ports located in the European part
before the Russian-Ukrainian military action. Today, the situation is changing.
Naturally, the question arises: if China is investing in
ports around the world, including European ports, and acquiring ports, why is
it not possible to do the same in the port of Anaklia?
In order to answer this question, it is necessary to analyze
the specifics of cargo flows on transport corridors and sea routes. This will
give an answer to the conditions under which Chinese cargo flows are attractive
in the port of Anaklia.
Analytics on this issue will be offered later.