London–Black Sea–Baltic Alliance

2026-10-14

The perspective of the new geopolitical axis of regional security

Europe's security architecture is changing. Russia's war against Ukraine, security challenges in Eastern Europe and the strategic importance of the Black and Baltic Seas have reinforced the need for the UK, Poland, Ukraine, the Baltic States, Moldova, Georgia and Turkey to work more closely together.

"London-Black Sea-Baltic Alliance" can be called a unified geopolitical concept of this cooperation. At this stage, this name does not refer to an officially created international organization. It combines existing partnerships and opportunities for future cooperation.

The essence of the idea is simple: the security of the Baltic and Black Sea regions is interconnected, and the political, military and diplomatic participation of Great Britain adds an additional strategic dimension to the cooperation between the countries of this space.

1. How the basis of cooperation was formed — chronology

2020 - Lublin Triangle and Quadriga

On July 28, the Lublin triangle was created - Ukraine, Poland and Lithuania. On December 18 of the same year, Ukraine and Turkey held the first meeting in the "quadriga" format at the level of foreign affairs and defense ministers. This strengthened the basis of cooperation connecting the Baltic and Black Sea spaces.

2021 - formation of an associated trio

On May 17, Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova created an associated trio, the purpose of which was cooperation in the process of integration into the European Union. In the view of Ukrainian diplomacy, these formats served to create a space of security and prosperity between the Baltic and Black Sea regions.

2022 - London-Warsaw-Kiev tripartite cooperation

On February 17, Great Britain, Poland and Ukraine announced the deepening of trilateral cooperation. Cyber ​​security, energy security, fight against disinformation and support of Ukraine against Russian aggression were identified as priorities.

2024 - Enhancing security partnership

Great Britain and Ukraine signed a security cooperation agreement, which included strengthening defense capabilities and maritime security. Britain has also been involved in supporting the development of Ukraine's naval capabilities.

2025 - Centenary Partnership and Black Sea-Baltic Security Connection

On January 16, London and Kyiv signed a centenary partnership agreement. The document envisages the strengthening of the defense industry, maritime security and strengthening the security of the Black, Baltic and Azov seas. This is a particularly important basis for the concept.

2026 - Strengthening British-Polish and North Baltic cooperation

On May 27, Great Britain and Poland signed the Security and Defense Partnership Agreement. And in March, Britain and the Northern Baltic partners reaffirmed their cooperation on issues of security and support to Ukraine. These developments strengthen the capacity for cooperation between London and the countries of the region.

2. The main purpose of creating the alliance

The main goal of the concept will be to create a space of security, political and economic cooperation with the participation of Great Britain, connecting the Black and Baltic seas.

Its strategic basis is three circumstances:

● Geographic interdependence: Military or hybrid threats in the Baltic region can affect Central and Eastern Europe, and the security of the Black Sea is important for the economic and military stability of Ukraine and the region.

● Great Britain's capabilities: London can offer its partners military expertise, intelligence cooperation, naval capabilities, defense technology and diplomatic support.

● Interests of regional partners: Poland and the Baltic states are interested in protecting the eastern flank; Ukraine — by protecting sovereignty and territorial integrity; Moldova and Georgia — with security and European integration; And Turkey with the stability of the Black Sea and maintaining regional influence.

These interests overlap, but not all countries have the same priorities.

3. Main tasks

1. Unified security vision. Development of threat assessment, early warning, and information-sharing systems in the Black Sea and Baltic Sea regions.

2. Defense cooperation. Joint exercises, air defense coordination, maritime security, and cooperation against drone and cyberattacks.

3. Energy independence. Protection of energy infrastructure, diversification of supply sources, and enhancing the resilience of critical facilities.

4. Transport and trade corridors. Development of ports, as well as rail and road connections, across the Baltic and Black Sea regions to reduce reliance on a single transit route.

5. Countering hybrid threats. Coordinated action against disinformation, cyberattacks, damage to critical infrastructure, and threats to maritime communications.

6. Support for European integration. Supporting the European aspirations of Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia, while taking into account the political decisions of the respective countries and the procedures of the European Union.

These objectives represent the goals of the proposed concept, rather than an approved program for an already established alliance. Some of these elements are already reflected in existing agreements and cooperation frameworks.

4. What role will Georgia play?

This concept holds particular significance for Georgia. Situated on the eastern coast of the Black Sea, the country is well-positioned to play a key role in developing transport and economic links between Europe and the South Caucasus.

Georgia’s participation could encompass:
● Cooperation regarding Black Sea maritime security and the protection of ports;
● Development of the Middle Corridor, as well as railway and transit infrastructure;
● Ensuring the security of energy and digital connections;
● Cooperation in countering disinformation and cyber threats;
● Supporting closer political and economic alignment with the European Union. However, Georgia’s actual participation will depend on its foreign policy course, its relations with partners, and specific agreements. Neither its geographical location nor its existing partnerships automatically guarantee security assurances.

5. Key Obstacles

The implementation of this concept will face several significant challenges.

First, there are divergent strategic interests. Turkey pursues its own regional policy and seeks to maintain room for maneuver in its relations with Russia. Not all participating countries will be equally prepared to reach an agreement on every issue.

Second, there is institutional ambiguity. The Lublin Triangle, the Associated Trio, the "Quadriga," and the UK-Poland-Ukraine format are mechanisms with different objectives and participants. Merging them into a single alliance would require separate political decisions and agreements.

Third, there is the issue of coordination with NATO and the EU. Any new structure must complement existing mechanisms rather than create conflicting obligations. NATO’s collective defense guarantees apply only to members of the Alliance, in accordance with the terms of the relevant treaty.

Fourth, resources and political will. Effective cooperation requires funding, shared priorities, regular meetings, and concrete projects.

6. Outlook: From Idea to Real-World Cooperation

The most realistic path is not the immediate creation of a new military bloc, but rather the interconnection of existing frameworks.

In the first phase, it is possible to strengthen regular political consultations, dialogue on maritime security, and cooperation in cybersecurity. In the second phase, joint infrastructure projects, defense production, the exchange of intelligence, and agreed-upon crisis response procedures could be developed. In the third phase—provided the participants possess the necessary political will—it would become possible to establish a permanent coordination mechanism. The 2025 agreement between Great Britain and Ukraine, the British-Polish defense partnership, and the activities of the Lublin Triangle serve as existing pillars in this regard. However, their existence does not yet imply the formation of a unified "London–Black Sea–Baltic Alliance."

Conclusion

A "London–Black Sea–Baltic Alliance" could emerge as a promising political concept for security cooperation across Eastern Europe and the Black Sea region. Its primary advantage would lie in integrating the capabilities of Great Britain, the regional roles of Poland and the Baltic states, Ukraine’s defense experience, and the European aspirations of Georgia and Moldova within a single framework.

Ultimately, the success of this concept will depend on whether the participants can move beyond individual, separate formats toward shared priorities—specifically in the realms of security, energy, trade, and critical infrastructure.

Should this cooperation be institutionalized, it could evolve into a significant geopolitical network linking the Black and Baltic Seas. Otherwise, it will remain a collection of useful, yet mutually separate, partnerships.

Zurab Maghradze, DBA

 

Sources:
gov.uk 
mfa.gov.ua
gov.pl